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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT DISREGARDED THE STANDARD OF
REVIEW UNDER RULE 12 OF THE UTAH RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE.

Defendants have completely ignored the Hickens' principal argument, that the trial
court failed to follow the applicable standard of review under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants' decision not to respond to that argument
neutralizes their other contentions.
Contrary to defendants' various arguments, their motion to dismiss did not open
the door for the trial court to resolve fact issues. See, e.g., defendants' brief at 19-21
(contending the trial court correctly disregarded the complaint's allegation that
defendants acquiesced in the Hickens' and their predecessors' continuous diversion for
stockwatering purposes for more than thirty years following the 1960 Decree). Nor did it
give the court license to interpret the 1960 Decree, which is silent on the issue of
stockwatering, against the Hickens. See, e.g., defendants' brief at 11 ("the res judicata
bar applies even though neither the pleadings nor the 1960 Judgment expressly referenced
a claim to divert continuously for 'watering livestock'").
The correct standard of review on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is as set forth in the
Hickens' opening brief. It favors adjudication of matters on their merits; it does not allow
motions such as defendants', which require resolution of fact issues before a plenary
presentation of the evidence, to be granted lightly. See, e.g., St. Benedict's Development
Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991) (court required to accept

the complaint's factual allegations as true and consider them and all reasonable inferences
in a light most favorable to the plaintiff); Arrow Industries, Inc. v. Zions National Bank,
767 P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 1988) (court should not grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion unless it
appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set of
facts that could be proved in support of its claims).
The Hickens' opening brief amply demonstrated the trial court's failure to follow
the established standard of review. Defendants have chosen to ignore that fact, and
instead have focused on unrelated factual assertions and purported inferences. For this
reason alone the dismissal order should be reversed. Other reasons are discussed below.1
II.

CLAIM PRECLUSION DOES NOT BAR THE HICKENS'
CLAIMS.
A.

The 1960 Lawsuit Did Not Litigate the Hickens' Right to
Divert Continuously for Stockwatering.

Defendants contend that claim preclusion prohibits the Hickens from litigating
their claims on the merits. Claim preclusion is the branch of res judicata that "prevents
parties or their privies from relitigating 'a claim for relief that was once litigated on the
1

One example of defendants' factual assertions is their denial of acquiescence in
the Hickens' continuous diversions of Spring Creek water for stockwatering purposes.
See defendants' brief at 20 n. 14 (alleging that North Ditch has repeatedly denied the
Hickens' right to divert continuously, citing a memorandum and affidavit the Hickens
submitted below). That assertion should be rejected as outside the four corners of the
complaint. Paragraphs 8-12 of the complaint (R. 20-21) allege that, until recently, the
stockwatering flow has been ongoing and continuous. Moreover, defendants have
distorted the cited memorandum since it states that defendants' interference began "with
the dry year," and that the Hickens' use before that time had been "continuous and
peaceful and uninterrupted for many years." (R. 31.)
2

merits and resulted in a final judgment between the same parties or their privies."' Salt
Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 913 P.2d 731, 733 (Utah 1995) (citations
omitted; emphasis deleted).2 The Hickens do not dispute that the 1960 Decree was a final
judgment between their predecessor in interest, Marvie Wall, and North Ditch Irrigation
Company. They do, however, vigorously deny that the claim for relief asserted in this
action — non-interference with the Hickens' stockwatering right ~ was litigated in the
1960 lawsuit.
Two Utah Supreme Court decisions involving claim preclusion in the context of
litigation over water illustrate this point. In the first case, East Mill Creek Water Co. v.
Salt Lake City, 108 Utah 315, 159 P.2d 863 (1945), East Mill Creek Water Company
sought a declaratory judgment interpreting its 1923 contract with Salt Lake City for an
exchange of water. The contract provided that for twenty years, or until the City sooner
annexed the territory served by the water company, the City would provide culinary and
irrigation water to the company's shareholders free of charge. After that time, the City
would provide culinary water to the shareholders on the same basis as it did to other
inhabitants of the City. Id. at 315-316, 159 P.2d at 864-65.
In 1938, the water company brought an action for a declaratory judgment requiring
the City to deliver culinary water through the shareholders' individual meters and to
2

Issue preclusion, which defendants have not asserted here, "prevents the
relitigation of issues that have been litigated and determined in another action even
though the underlying claims in the two actions may be different." Salt Lake City v.
Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 913 P.2d 731, 733 n. 1 (Utah 1995) (citation omitted).
3

collect water charges directly from the shareholders rather than the company. The City
obtained a judgment, the effect of which was limited to the twenty-year period during
which the City was required to deliver water free of charge. Id. at 315, 159 P.2d at 866.
Apparently after the twenty-year period had expired, the water company brought
another action again challenging the City's delivery of culinary water directly to the
company rather than to the shareholders. The result of such delivery was that the
company had to read individual meters, collect from the shareholders, and pay for all
waters lost in the water system it shared with others. Id. at 320, 159 P.2d 865. The trial
court agreed with the City that res judicata barred the second action, but the Utah
Supreme Court reversed.
The court recognized, albeit without using the current terminology, the distinction
between claim preclusion and issue preclusion:
[Claim preclusion] applies not only to points and issues which are actually
raised and decided [in the first case] but also to such as could have been
therein adjudicated, but it only applies where the claim, demand or cause of
action is the same in both cases. * * * On the other hand where the claim,
demand or cause of action is different in the two cases then the former is
res judicata of the latter only to the extent that the former actually raised
and decided the same points and issues which are raised in the latter.
Id. at 321-322, 159 P.2d at 866 (emphasis added; citations omitted).
The court went on to hold that the water company's second action was not barred
by claim preclusion because it did not involve the same claim as the first action:
In the former action the company relied on general provisions of the
contract and the provisions that were in effect during the time that the city

4

was required to furnish free water. It did not allege or rely on any provision
which took effect only after that period had ended.
* * *

[This action]. . . does involve the interpretation of the same contract, but
the question to be determined in the two actions are [sic] different, the
provisions governing in this case are different from those governing in the
former case.
Id
Under East Mill Creek, claim preclusion does not bar the Hickens' claims here
since they differ from those asserted in the 1960 lawsuit. The Findings of Fact on which
the 1960 Decree is based plainly refer to only the water rights used by Marvie Wall to
"irrigate lawn, garden and pasture" (emphasis added). (R. 57.) The complaint in this
case, by contrast, alleges that defendants have interfered with the Hickens' stockwatering
right, which was established and confirmed by the Diligence Claim, their water user's
claim and the proposed determination. (R. 1-15, 20.) The 1960 Decree's silence on the
issue of stockwater demonstrates that the claim to stockwater was neither raised nor
litigated in the 1960 lawsuit.
The second Utah Supreme Court decision involving claim preclusion in water
litigation is Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp,, 913 P.2d 731 (Utah 1995).
Silver Fork Pipeline Corporation had intervened as a co-plaintiff with Salt Lake City in an
action against other users of water collected in a certain mine tunnel. Silver Fork did not
dispute the City's right to control the water as against the defendants' claim in that action,
and even stated that its own right was based on a written contract with the City. Many
5

years later, the City sued Silver Fork to quiet title to the mine tunnel water. The trial
court entered summary judgment for the City on the basis of res judicata.
The Utah Supreme Court reversed, holding that claim preclusion did not bar Silver
Fork's claim to the tunnel water. Because the parties were co-plaintiffs in the first action,
their interests were not sufficiently adverse to provide them a "full and fair opportunity to
litigate between themselves the claim that the City did not have the right to control tunnel
waters." Id. at 733. Moreover, since the defendants in the previous lawsuit conceded the
City's ownership of the tunnel water early on in the litigation, "that issue was not
litigated on the merits." Id.
Here, the Hickens' claim of a stock watering right was not litigated on the merits
in the 1960 lawsuit. The record is silent as to stock water. As in Silver Fork, there is no
indication that the parties had a full and fair opportunity, much less any motivation, to
litigate the stockwater claim in the 1960 lawsuit.
B.

The Hickens' Claim Is Not a Claim that Marvie Wall
Could Have and Should Have Raised in the 1960 Lawsuit.

Defendants assert that, even if the 1960 Decree is unclear, the Hickens' claim is
barred because Marvie Wall should have raised the stockwater claim in the 1960 lawsuit.
In making this argument, defendants mistakenly rely on Wall's filing of the Diligence
Claim before the Decree was entered.
As alleged in the Hickens' complaint, the continuous diversion for stockwatering
was ongoing and continuous for many years. (R. 19-20.) The Diligence Claim, which is
6

attached to the Hickens' complaint, bases the stockwatering right on continuous use since
before 1903. (R. 11-12, 15.) The complaint alleges that North Ditch did not interfere
with this use until recently. (R. 19.) Therefore, Wall's filing of the Diligence Claim, as
well as the defendants' continuing acquiescence in the stockwatering diversions,
demonstrate only that the parties to the 1960 lawsuit considered Wall's stockwatering use
as separate from the irrigation use then at issue. Since there is no indication the parties
were at odds on the stockwater issue, the Hickens' should not be prejudiced by Wall's
decision not to assert, or even his failure to assert, the stockwatering right in the 1960
lawsuit.
Defendants mistakenly rely on Warren Irrigation Co. v. Brown, 28 Utah 2d 103,
498 P.2d 667 (1972) as requiring Wall to have raised the stockwater claim in the 1960
lawsuit. That case actually supports the Hickens' position.
One of the questions involved in Warren Irrigation was whether court decrees in
1914 and 1938 superseded certain restrictions in a 1903 deed between the parties'
predecessors in interest. As quoted in defendants' brief:
The trial court found that the rights and obligations of the parties had been
determined by the two decrees, and the matter was now res judicata. The
court observed that after living with these decrees for nearly 50 years,
plaintiff was not in a position to raise issues, which were or could have
been previously settled.
Id at 106, 498 P.2d at 669. Importantly, defendants failed to quote the next two
sentences, which further explain the trial court's findings:

7

The court found that plaintiff was barred by conduct, laches, and
acquiescence as to the use of water outside of the 147-acre tract specified
in the 1903 deed. Furthermore, the 1914 decree was in lieu of the 1903
deed and contained no such limitation.
Id. (emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision, noting
that in the 1938 case brought by the defendants' predecessors against the plaintiff, "the
issue of ownership was asserted and admitted. Since plaintiff failed to raise this issue or
litigate it, the doctrine of res judicata applies." Id. at 107, 498 P.2d at 670 (emphasis
added).
Warren Irrigation does not support the finding of res judicata in this case. First,
unlike the two decrees in Warren Irrigation, the 1960 Decree here did not determine all
of the rights and obligations of the parties - only those concerning Wall's use of
irrigation water. Second, the issue of continuous stockwater diversions was neither raised
nor admitted in the 1960 lawsuit and therefore cannot support res judicata under Warren
Irrigation. Finally, the Hickens have alleged, and must be given the opportunity to prove,
that defendants have lived for 35 years with an interpretation of the 1960 Decree that was
restricted to irrigation water. Since defendants have allowed the Hickens to divert
stockwater continuously during that time, defendants, like the plaintiff in Warren
Irrigation, are barred by conduct, laches and acquiescence from contending the 1960
Decree covered stockwater diversions as well as irrigation water. Orderville Irrigation
Co. v. Glendale Irrigation Co., 17 Utah 2d 282, 285-286, 409 P.2d 616, 620 (1965) (the
parties' interpretation of a water rights decree evidences the decree's intent).
8

C.

Defendants' Acquiescence in the Hickens' Continuous
Stockwatering Diversions Manifests Their Understanding
that the 1960 Decree Applied Only to Irrigation Rights.

Contrary to defendants' argument (see defendants' brief at 19-21), the trial court
erred in disregarding the complaint's allegations that defendants acquiesced in the
continuous stockwatering diversions. St. Benedict's Development Co. v. St. Benedict's
Hospital, 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991) (on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court is
required to accept the complaint's factual allegations as true).
The allegations about defendants' acquiescence are critical. To the extent the
1960 Decree is ambiguous, the parties' interpretation and application of the Decree, as
demonstrated by their conduct, is the best evidence of the scope of the lawsuit and the
Decree. Orderville Irrigation Co. v. Glendale Irrigation Co., 17 Utah 2d 282, 286, 409
P.2d 616, 620 (1965) (the parties' acquiescence in a particular interpretation of a water
rights decree is evidence of their intent, and "it should not be changed by the parties or by
the courts except for cogent and persuasive reasons").
Here, the parties' conduct since the 1960 Decree demonstrates that they
considered the stockwatering claim as outside the original litigation. Defendants
acquiesced in the Hickens' continuous diversions of stockwater for many years. If they
had believed the 1960 Decree clearly prohibited the Hickens' continuous diversions for
stockwatering (as they now claim), they should have sought to enjoin the diversion early
on as a violation of the Decree.

9

And if defendants dispute the allegations of acquiescence, the proper remedy is a
plenary trial on the merits. Rule 12(b)(6) should not be used to foreclose the Hickens
from presenting evidence to support their allegations. See Orderville Irrigation, 17 Utah
2d 282, 286, 409 P.2d^*f 619-20 (the trial court should "look to the background
circumstances and . . . consider extraneous evidence in determining what was intended by
the adjudication of water rights in [an ambiguous] Decree").
III.

DEFENDANTS HAVE MISAPPLIED THE PLAIN
LANGUAGE RULE TO SUPPORT AN ANOMALOUS AND
UNFAIR INTERPRETATION OF THE 1960 DECREE.
A.

Under the Plain Language Rule, "Turns" Should Be Construed
to Refer to the Hickens9 Irrigation Rights Alone.

Defendants recognize that the 1960 Decree should be interpreted according to "the
ordinary and usual meaning of the words used." Plain City Irrigation Co. v. Hooper
Irrigation Co., 11 Utah 2d 188, 191, 356 P.2d 625, 627 (1960), cited in defendants' brief
at p. 18. However, defendants have twisted that rule (commonly called the plain
language rule), and have ignored other recognized rules of construction, to preempt any
interpretation of the Decree but their own.
Primarily, defendants have attempted to stand the Decree's use of the term "turns"
on its head. The Hickens agree that a "turn" may be defined as an opportunity taken in a
scheduled order. (See defendants' brief at 18). But, despite defendants' assertion, the
Decree's requirement that Marvie Wall "take his water in turns" does not "inherently

10

[preclude] a continuous diversion from Spring Creek for any use." Defendants' brief at
18 (emphasis added).
On the contrary, it suggests that the Decree was referring only to irrigation water.
As the Hickens' opening brief pointed out, in water litigation "turns" is generally used to
refer to distribution of irrigation water. See, e.g., Bigler v. Mapleton Irr. Canal Co., 669
P.2d 434, 435 (Utah 1983) (water distributed by canal company for irrigation is defined
as "irrigation turns"); Moyle v. Salt Lake City, 111 Utah 201, 209, 176 P.2d 882, 887
(1947) (irrigation company water master issued tickets for shareholders' "irrigation
turns"). And it is logical to assume the Decree did not cover stockwater diversions since
cattle require water daily instead of once every ten days for two hours. Judge Nelson
easily could have specified not only an irrigation right but also a storage right if he had
intended that any stockwater be stored for use between diversion turns.
It makes much more sense to concludefromthe Decree's plain language, as well
as its silence on the issue of stockwatering, that it simply did not cover stockwatering
diversions, which were separate and continuous. This is especially true in light of the
parties' conduct consistent with that interpretation for more than 30 years after the
Decree was entered. Under the plain language rule, the Decree's use of the language
"take his water in turns" is compelling evidence that the Decree adjudicated only
irrigation water rights.

11

B.

Other Recognized Rules of Construction Favor a Narrow
Interpretation of the 1960 Decree.

Defendants have ignored the application of other recognized rules of contract
construction to the 1960 Decree. The Hickens' opening brief refers to several of them, as
enunciated in Plain City Irrigation Co. v. Hooper Irrigation Co., 11 Utah 2d 188, 356
P.2d 625 (1960). Defendants have not disputed those rules, but their interpretation of the
Decree violates them.
In particular, the Plain City Irrigation case held that the omission in a decree of
any mention of future acquisitions of water suggested the parties did not intend to cover
future purchases. Id. at 192, 356 P.2d at 628. Here, the 1960 Decree's silence on
stockwatering rights, coupled with the finding of fact on Marvie Wall's irrigation use
only, suggests the parties did not intend the 1960 Decree to restrict continuous diversions
of stockwater.
Additionally, an interpretation that produces an inequitable result should be
avoided unless the contract (or, in this case, the Decree) unequivocally provides to the
contrary. Id. Here, interpreting the Decree to limit all stockwater diversions to once
every ten days would reverse the parties' practice of more than thirty years. It would
presumably force the Hickens to construct stockwater storage facilities, among other
things, to accommodate this new interpretation.
An anomalous result should also be avoided. See Plain City Irrigation, 11 Utah
2d at 192, 356 P.2d at 628 ("a fair and equitable result will be preferred over a harsh or
12

unreasonable one"); cf Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980)
("[statutory] interpretations are to be avoided which render some part of a provision
nonsensical or absurd"); Curtis v. Harmon Electronics, Inc., 575 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah
1978) ("A sound rule of statutory interpretation is that a statute is presumed not to be
intended to produce absurd consequences . . . ").
Defendants' interpretation of "turns" as applying to all diversions by the Hickens
is anomalous: winter stockwatering in Wallsburg cannot be limited to intermittent use
since the diversion ditch would freeze over without a continuous flow. Cf. defendants'
brief at 24 (recognizing the Hickens' year-round stock watering right, but contending that
it is restricted to intermittent diversions from Spring Creek). Irrigation water is typically
taken in turns throughout the summer irrigation season; winter water, including
stockwater, is generally diverted continuously.
Finally, as defendants point out, each part of the 1960 Decree should be
harmonized so as to give effect to every provision. (Defendants' brief at 18 n. 10, citing
Larrabee v. Royal Dairy Products Co., 614 P.2d 160 (Utah 1980); and Jones v. Hinkle,
611 P.2d 733 (Utah 1980).) By interpreting the Decree broadly to limit Marvie Wall's
stockwatering right, defendants ignore the finding of fact that the controversy grew out of
Wall's diversions to "irrigate lawn, garden and pasture." (R. 57.) To give effect to this
finding, the Decree should be interpreted as covering only irrigation rights.

13

IV.

DEFENDANTS HAVE MISAPPLIED PERTINENT CASES.

Defendants contend that cases cited by the Hickens do not apply since they
allegedly involved decrees in general, as opposed to specific, adjudications of water
rights. Defendants even claim the Hickens have attempted "to evade res judicata by
incorrectly casting the 1960 Judgment as just a 'general adjudication.'" Defendants' brief
at 14. Defendants have misread the cases and the Hickens' brief.
First, the Hickens acknowledge there are different processes between lawsuits
ending in specific water rights decrees and statutory proceedings in a general
adjudication. However, by citing cases that interpreted general adjudication decrees, the
Hickens did not cast the 1960 Decree as a general adjudication. More important, there is
no indication in the cases themselves that the principles of construction they enunciate do
not apply to specific decrees like the 1960 Decree.
Plain City Irrigation Co, v. Hooper Irrigation Co., 11 Utah 2d 188, 356 P.2d 625
(1960), the Hickens' principal authority for interpreting a water rights decree, involved a
stipulated decree that was entered years after the general adjudication resulting in the
Weber River Decree. Compare 11 Utah 2d at 189, 356 P.2d at 626 (subject decree
entered in 1948), with Provo River Water Users'Ass 'n v. Morgan, 857 P.2d 927, 928-29
(Utah 1993) (final Weber River Decree entered in 1937). The Plain City Irrigation
opinion does not specify that the decree it interpreted was part of the general adjudication
or state that, even if it was, different principles of construction would apply.

14

In Orderville Irrigation Co. v. Glendale Irrigation Co., 17 Utah 2d 282, 409 P.2d
616 (1965), the Utah Supreme Court interpreted three separate decrees. The first, the
McCarty Decree, was entered in 1900 ~ years before the general adjudication statute was
enacted. The other two decrees, the Burton Decree and the Cox Decree, were entered as
part of the general adjudication of rights in the Virgin River system. The court stated that
"whatever issues were litigated and adjudicated in the Cox Decree are now concluded and
cannot be raised." Id. at 285, 409 P.2d at 619. Thus, the court treated the general
adjudication decree the same as a specific decree for purposes of res judicata.
Contrary to defendants' assertions, the Orderville Irrigation court did not hold that
general adjudication decrees fall outside the scope of res judicata. See defendants' brief
at 15. Rather, it held that any
adjudication as to the allocation of flowing water, the amount of which
necessarily fluctuates from time to time, is a decree in equity as to the rights
in their continuing use. It is inherent in the nature of such a decree that the
court has continuing jurisdiction, when properly invoked, to see that its
provisions are being complied with. Where disputes arise as to the manner
or amount of use; or where there are uncertainties in the decree which give
rise to a genuine dispute as to the rights of the parties concerning the use of
such waters, neither the rule of res judicata nor the statute of limitations
prevents resort to the courts to settle such a controversy.
Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, even a specific decree allocating flowing water, as the
1960 Decree here, is subject to subsequent challenge when uncertainties in the decree
give rise to a genuine dispute among water users. Such is the dispute between the
Hickens and defendants, who differ as to whether the 1960 Decree covered continuous
stockwatering diversions or only intermittent irrigation diversions.
15

Orderville Irrigation went on to hold that the Cox Decree's specification of
priorities of certain water rights did not bar the plaintiffs' claim that water from a Virgin
River tributary should be allocated on a proportional, equal-priority basis. The court
based its holding in part on the language of the Cox Decree itself. The court found that
since some water rights were given priority in the Cox Decree, the priority of other rights,
including those at issue in Orderville Irrigation, were not litigated in the general
adjudication culminating in the Cox Decree. The Cox Decree therefore was not res
judicata on that issue. Id.
The court also relied on the parties' course of conduct over a sixty-year period
extending from 30 years before through 30 years after the Cox Decree. The court found
that the parties' adherence for sixty years to the McCarty Decree, which did not establish
priorities, was evidence that the Burton and Cox Decrees did not impose priorities or
even reach the priority issue, and were therefore not res judicata. Id. at 285-287, 409
P.2d at 619-20.
In Provo River Water Users1 Association v. Morgan, 857 P.2d 927 (Utah 1993),
the Utah Supreme Court found the Weber River Decree to be ambiguous on the issue of
whether it extended beyond the Weber River and its surface tributaries to isolated
groundwater rights within the Weber River watershed. Therefore, the court looked to
background circumstances and extraneous evidence to determine the Decree's intent.
See, id at 931-33.
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Again, the court applied the same principles of contract interpretation and res
judicata to the general Weber River Decree as to specific waterrightsdecrees in other
cases. The court even acknowledged that in a general adjudication, "'the judgment
arrived at must have some degree of finality and solidarity,'. . . and collateral attacks
should be discouraged.. .." Id. at 935 (citations omitted). Defendants' attempt to
distinguish Provo River Water Users because it involved a general adjudication is hollow.
Provo River Water Users is also important because it found that "the [Weber
River] decree was not intended to adjudicate the rights to isolated springs that are not
expressly addressed in the decree." Id. at 933 (emphasis added). Here, the 1960 Decree
did not expressly address continuous stockwatering diversions. Its only reference to
specific use was the finding of fact with respect to the water rights then at issue ~ those
used by Marvie Wall to "irrigate lawn, garden and pasture"(emphasis added). (R. 57.)
Accordingly, the 1960 Decree is not res judicata on the issue of stockwatering rights.3
Finally, defendants' reliance on Logan, Hyde Park & Smithfield Canal Co. v.
Logan City, 72 Utah 221, 269 P. 776 (1928), is misplaced. Logan interpreted a water
rights decree that was unambiguous on its face. Provo River Water Users' Ass 'n V.

3

Defendants contend the Hickens' cases are distinguishable because only specific
water rights decrees are "the usual type of judgment that is subject to the principles of res
judicata." Defendants' brief at 15, citing Little v. Greene & Weed Investment, 839 P.2d
791, 794 (Utah 1992). Little does not extend that far. It merely acknowledges that
private suits are one way of vesting waterrightsin Utah. Little decided quite a different
issue: at what point in the process of perfecting a water right does the right become
appurtenant to land so that it passes with a conveyance of the land. Id. at 795.
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Morgan, supra, 857 P.2d at 931. It also involved a lawsuit that required Logan City "to
assert any claim it had, of any nature or kind, which was adverse to or inconsistent with
the rights claimed in the pleadings." Logan, 72 Utah at 228, 269 P. at 778.
The 1960 Decree and lawsuit that defendants here claim are res judicata were
otherwise. As demonstrated above, the Decree did not unambiguously regulate all
diversions from Spring Creek, including stockwater diversions. Additionally, there is no
evidence that Marvie Wall was required to assert all of his water rights in the 1960
lawsuit. On the contrary, the parties' course of conduct after the lawsuit suggests only
that they considered stockwatering diversions to be outside the scope of the Decree. In
any case, on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court should indulge all reasonable inferences in
favor of the Hickens' interpretation of the Decree. St. Benedict's Development Co. v. St.
Benedict's Hospital 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991).4
V.

THE PROPOSED DETERMINATION DOES NOT BAR THE
HICKENS' CLAIMS.

Defendants erroneously assert that the Proposed Determination (R. 1-2)
specifically and unambiguously restricts the Hickens to intermittent diversions from
Spring Creek for both irrigation and stockwatering. They contend that the Hickens'

4

Defendants claim the 68-year old Logan decision is strong precedent for this case because
of its "solid, time-proven holding and rationale." Defendants' brief at 10 n. 6. The Hickens do
not disparage that decision, but it does not apply here for the reasons stated above. The Provo
River Water Users case distinguished Logan as involving a facially unambiguous decree. 857
P.2d at 931. That is not the situation here, where on defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the
Court is required to resolve any ambiguities in the 1960 Decree in favor of the Hickens.
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alleged failure to object to the Proposed Determination bars their claim to a continuous
diversion right.
Again, defendants have asked the Court to resolve ambiguities in the Proposed
Determination in their favor on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. The Proposed Determination
clearly defines rights to water for two separate uses — 3.80 acre-feet for the irrigation of
0.95 acre of land from April 1 to October 31, and 1.01 acre-feet for watering 36
equivalent livestock units year-round. (R. 1.) The Proposed Determination states that it
is based on Marvie Wall's diligence claim, D807. Id. As alleged in the complaint,
continuous diversions for stockwatering as reflected in the diligence claim date back to
before 1903 and extend for years past the 1960 Decree. In that context, the Proposed
Determination's mention of intermittent diversions produces, at most, an ambiguity that
the Court should resolve in favor of the Hickens at this juncture.
Additionally, as discussed above, it makes no sense to limit winter stockwatering
diversions under the Proposed Determination to two hours once every 10 days. The small
amounts of stockwater diverted on that schedule would freeze, and therefore would not
provide a source for the livestock to drink. Since defendants' interpretation of the
Proposed Determination would produce anomalous results, it should not be favored.
Plain City Irrigation Co. v. Hooper Irrigation Co., supra, 11 Utah 2d at 192, 356 P.2d at
628. The Court should give the Hickens an opportunity to put on evidence of usage and
intent rather than bar their claim based solely on their alleged failure to timely object to
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the ambiguous Proposed Determination. OrderviUe Irrigation Co. v. Glendale Irrigation
Co., 17 Utah 2d 282, 409 P.2d 616 (1965).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above and in the Hickens' opening brief, the trial court erred
in granting Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss with prejudice. This Court
should reverse the Ruling and Order of the trial court, and remand this case for further
proceedings.
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